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MISSING THE MARK: NYSRPA AS A
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INTRODUCTION
Federal mootness doctrine provides little guidance and
predictability,1 and the Court’s vacillation between constitutional and
prudential mootness is largely to blame.2 The two approaches to
mootness differ in important respects: Constitutional mootness treats
mootness as a constitutional mandate that precludes exercising
jurisdiction,3 while prudential mootness relies on discretion4 and
practical considerations such as courts’ equity powers, efficiency, and
economy.5 In some cases, outcomes “may depend on whether the
mootness bar is understood as a prudential or constitutionally
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1. Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
562, 564 (2009) (“Mootness doctrine, as currently constituted, does not provide the analytic tools
necessary to explain or predict the results in a large number of mootness cases.”).
2. See id. at 562 (arguing that mootness “lacks a coherent theoretical foundation” given the
Court’s vacillation between constitutional and prudential mootness).
3. Id. at 571–72.
4. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RES. SERV., RS22599, MOOTNESS: AN EXPLANATION OF THE
JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINE, 4 (2007) (citing Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 627 F.2d
289, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (noting that, unlike constitutional mootness, prudential mootness
“address[es] not the power to grant relief but the court’s discretion in the exercise of that power”).
5. Hall, supra note 1, at 609 (noting that prudential factors include, at least, “(1) whether
the policies that are typically said to be served by justiciability doctrines are sufficiently satisfied
under the circumstances of the case; (2) the importance of adjudicating the issue or issues
promptly; (3) the effect on judicial authority of hearing and deciding the claim; and (4) the effect
on the efficient use of judicial resources of hearing and deciding the claim”).
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mandated doctrine.”6 Often, the Court’s inconsistent use of
constitutional and prudential mootness produces “dramatic variations
in jurisdictional analysis” and results.7
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New
York (“NYSRPA”), New York City residents challenged in federal
court a New York City (“City”) ordinance that barred firearms
transport across city lines to second homes and shooting ranges.8 The
Southern District of New York found that the law minimally burdened
Petitioners’ Second Amendment rights and subsequently dismissed the
complaint.9 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
decision, and Petitioners subsequently sought certiorari from the
Supreme Court.10 But three months after the Court granted cert,11 the
City amended its ordinance to allow licensed firearms transport to nonCity secondary homes and shooting ranges.12 New York State then
enacted a law prohibiting cities from adopting restrictions on licensed
transport.13 In response to these developments, the City filed a
Suggestion of Mootness with the Court.14 And in 2020, the Court held
that the City’s and State’s regulatory amendments had mooted the
case.15
This paper will analyze NYSRPA in light of the dichotomous
federal mootness framework, assessing how NYSRPA engages with the
constitutional and prudential mootness distinction. Ultimately,
NYSRPA was a missed opportunity to clarify lingering uncertainties in
mootness doctrine. The opinion did not mention or adopt either
formulation outright, though the Court’s reasoning appeared to affirm
constitutional mootness as the basis for its decision. Still, NYSRPA
6. Id. at 564.
7. Gene R. Nichol Jr., Moot Cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the Supreme Court, 22
CONN. L. REV. 703, 714 (1990).
8. 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3) (2019).
9. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 86 F. Supp. 3d 249, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d sub nom. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York,
883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded sub nom. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n,
Inc. v. City of New York, New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiffs-Appellants, New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n, Inc. v. The City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 152 (2020) (No. 18-280).
11. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 883 F.3d at 53–54 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, N.Y.
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
12. 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3) (2019).
13. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(6) (2019).
14. Suggestion of Mootness, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883
F.3d 45 (2019) (No. 18-280), 2019 WL 3451573.
15. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526–27 (2020)
(per curiam).
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could serve as a springboard to clarify and constitutionalize mootness
doctrine in line with the Court’s existing jurisprudence. To make sense
of how NYSRPA fits into the Court’s jurisprudence, this Note will
proceed as follows: Part I describes the Court’s basic mootness
framework. Part II analyzes inconsistencies caused by flip-flopping
between the mootness approaches and juxtaposes two affirmative
action cases to illustrate how the Court’s mootness jurisprudence has
produced different jurisdictional outcomes for similarly situated
plaintiffs. Part III addresses the Court’s use of these approaches in the
related field of standing because, like mootness, prudential and
constitutional elements of standing are muddied. Part IV focuses on
NYSRPA and its doctrinal significance, and Part V argues for the
adoption of the more predictable constitutional approach as the
framework for federal mootness decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
Mootness is but one element of Article III courts’ jurisdiction
inquiry. To exercise Article III jurisdiction, a case must present a proper
case or controversy.16 Absent a live case or controversy, a court’s
opinion would be merely advisory, thereby violating the court’s
constitutional mandate.17 However, the Court has emphasized
flexibility in the mootness doctrine and carved out three exceptions to
mootness: voluntary cessation, capable of repetition yet evading review,
and class actions.18 Where an exception is satisfied, the court may
exercise jurisdiction. Section A describes the basic mootness inquiry
and its deeply intertwined sister doctrine, standing, and Section B
focuses on mootness exceptions.
A. Current Legal Framework
It is impossible to discuss mootness without briefly explicating the
basic standing requirements. Mootness is often described as “standing
in a time frame.”19 A legal interest must exist at the start of litigation

16. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (holding where “a dispute is
not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law
in the course of doing so”).
17. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (“The case has therefore lost its character as a
present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on
abstract propositions of law.”).
18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98–101 (3d ed. 2009).
19. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (quotation omitted).
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(standing) and must be “live” until the case is resolved (mootness).20
Standing requires (a) injury to a personal right that is both
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical;” (b) a causal connection between the injury and the
challenged conduct; and (c) a “likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.”21 The standing injury requirement
is often referred to as a personal stake.22 Mootness doctrine adds a
temporal requirement to that personal stake: To overcome mootness,
the personal stake or interest must be extant at all stages of review, not
just at the time the complaint is filed.23 Without such interest, the court
may not exercise jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed on
mootness grounds.
With respect to the personal stake requirement, the Court has
distorted the doctrine to decide questions of political and normative
importance.24 In Roe v. Wade, plaintiff McCorvey was no longer
pregnant when the case reached the Court;25 thus, her personal stake in
the outcome had since expired.26 Forced to operate within the confines
of existing personal stake precedent, the Court engaged in analytical
acrobatics to reach the merits.27 The Court held that, because
McCorvey could become pregnant again, pregnancy was capable of
repetition yet evading review.28 However, most women of a
childbearing age may become pregnant at some point, so the proffered
personal stake was really a generalized grievance.29 In reaching the
20. Id.
21. N.E. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 663–64 (1993).
22. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 63 (7th ed. 2016) (using “personal
stake” to discuss whether the personally suffered injury requirement is met).
23. Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 376 (1974) (“Mootness questions
arise only once a court has determined, usually implicitly, that a litigant has standing to bring the
action the doctrine of mootness requires that ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages
of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’”) (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 459 n.10 (1974)).
24. Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV 605, 631 (1992).
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
26. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that exercise of jurisdiction requires a
pregnant woman in her first trimester because plaintiffs cannot vindicate others’ rights).
27. See Tsen Lee, supra note 24, at 631 (“It is unfortunate that the majority was forced to
this kind of rationalization merely because it had the good sense not to deny the importance of
the merits of those cases and because previous cases had frozen the personal stake requirement
into Article III.”).
28. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125.
29. Tsen Lee, supra note 24, at 624 (“[H]er personal stake could not have been the
protection of her right to obtain an abortion in the future, because this stake ultimately collapses
into a generalized grievance.”).
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merits on what amounts to a generalized grievance, the Roe Court
essentially made an exception to the personal stake requirement.30
Similarly, the Court in United States Parole Commissioner v.
Geraghty offered a broad interpretation of the requirement. In that
case, the Court acknowledged that the named plaintiff’s personal stake
in the outcome was moot but found a personal stake in the procedural
decision—class certification—satisfactory.31 This rationale plainly
deviated from precedent and the spirit of the requirement; it made little
sense to find a personal stake not grounded in the litigation itself.32
Thus, the Court warped the definition of personal stake to decide an
issue of constitutional and normative import: the fair treatment of
inmates.33 In the opinion, the Court even recognized that its reasoning
deviated from formalistic Article III requirements,34 noting that
Geraghty was not the first justiciability decision to suffer from this
infirmity.35
B. Exceptions to Mootness
Within this framework, the Court has carved out three exceptions
to mootness: (1) voluntary cessation, (2) capable of repetition yet
evading review, and (3) class action lawsuits.36 Where an exception
applies and jurisdiction is otherwise satisfied, the Court may reach the
merits of the dispute.

30. Id. See also Hall, supra note 1, at 564 (arguing the plaintiff in Roe failed to demonstrate
the likelihood of being subjected to the same conduct).
31. U.S. Parole Comm’r v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980) (“We think that in
determining whether the plaintiff may continue to press the class certification claim, after the
claim on the merits expires, we must look to the nature of the personal stake in the class
certification claim.”) (internal quotations omitted).
32. Tsen Lee, supra note 24, at 625 (noting that the plaintiff would have no personal stake
in class certification, “other than the satisfaction of inflicting a wound on the ‘system’ that
wounded him”).
33. See id. at 624 (“[T]he Court was straining to find a way to review the denial of
certification.”).
34. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11 (“Our point is that the strict, formalistic view of Art.
III jurisprudence, while perhaps the starting point of all inquiry, is riddled with exceptions. And,
in creating each exception, the Court has looked to practicalities and prudential considerations.
The resulting doctrine can be characterized, aptly, as ‘flexible;’ it has been developed, not
irresponsibly, but ‘with some care,’ including the present case.”) (citations omitted).
35. See id. (“The erosion of the strict, formalistic perception of Art. III was begun well
before today’s decision.”).
36. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 123 (4th ed.
2011).
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1. Voluntary Cessation
The voluntary cessation exception provides that a case is not moot
if “the defendant voluntarily ceases the alleged improper behavior but
is free to return to it at any time.”37 The court may discern an intent to
reinstate a challenged provision from pleadings38 or other conduct.39
For example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc.,40 the defendant-company dumped excessive mercury 489
times.41 The Court cited this past “continuous and pervasive conduct”
in its assessment of the reasonable likelihood that the conduct would
reoccur.42 In determining the likelihood that challenged conduct will
resume, the Court applies a “stringent” standard:43 A case is moot only
“if subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”44
Governments, unlike natural persons, are accorded some deference.
Barring contrary evidence, the court presumes that governments do not
act in bad faith and will not resume the alleged improper conduct.45
2. Injuries Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review
The court may find an injury capable of repetition yet evading
review where the injury is of short duration and will always likely evade
review46 or it is likely to recur because the plaintiff will likely be subject
to the offending law again.47 In Moore v. Ogilvie, candidates challenged
an Illinois statute that required candidates to file a petition signed by

37. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 149.
38. Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (finding that the union is likely to
resume the challenged practices because it defended the practice in its petition).
39. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) (weighing legislative
reenactment of a different provision of the same law toward the possibility of reenacting the
provision at issue).
40. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
41. Id. at 176.
42. See id. at 184 (citing the pervasive nature of the conduct in the finding of injury-in-fact).
43. Id. at 189.
44. Id. (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968)).
45. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656,
677 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Unlike in City of Mesquite, in the ordinary case it is not
at all reasonable to suppose that the legislature has repealed or amended a challenged law simply
to avoid litigation and that it will reinstate the original legislation if given the opportunity.”).
46. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1, 6 (1986) (holing
case not moot because criminal proceedings are so short in duration that they evade review).
47. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 578 (1987) (finding injury
capable of repetition but evading review because the mining company challenging the regulation
would continue to be subject to the regulation as long as it kept operating).
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at least 25,000 voters in order to be listed on an election ballot.48 The
plaintiffs failed to obtain the requisite signatures and were
consequently omitted from the 1968 ballot,49 and the relevant election
occurred before the Court could hear the case.50 Although it was
impossible to grant retrospective relief, the Court found that the
challenged conduct was capable of repetition yet evading review
because “the burden . . . placed on the nomination of candidates for
statewide offices remain[ed] and control[ed] future elections.”51
To assert its jurisdiction, the Court has also abandoned certain
elements of this exception. Courts will hear cases alleging wrongs
capable of repetition yet evading review where there is no reasonable
expectation that the challenged conduct will persist and continue to
harm the particular plaintiff,52 though articulated as a requirement.53
Instead, courts reach the merits based on the “likelihood of recurrence
to others.”54 In Gerstein v. Pugh,55 the “speculative possibility” of a
named plaintiff’s rearrest, combined with the “certainty” that others
would be subject to the same harmful procedures, sufficiently
demonstrated the challenged conduct would likely reoccur.56
3. Class Actions
The class action exception allows courts to reach the merits of a
class action even when the named class representative’s personal stake
in the matter has become moot.57 The Court has reasoned that the class
48. 394 U.S. 814, 815 (1969).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 816.
51. Id.
52. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (finding a right to abortion claim not
moot because “[p]regnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general
population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us”) (emphasis added); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972) (stressing that “[a]lthough appellee now can vote, the problem to
voters posed by the Tennessee residence requirements is capable of repetition, yet evading
review”).
53. See e.g., DeFunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312, 319 (ruling that the injury was not capable
of repetition yet evading review because plaintiff “will never again” be resubjected to the
challenge conduct); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49 (1969) (ruling that the possibility of being
resubjected to the challenged conduct by moving and then reestablishing residence within two
months of a presidential election was a “speculative contingenc[y]” that did not rise to a likelihood
of recurrence).
54. See e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 333 n.2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969)
(finding the case not moot though plaintiffs could not be offered relief because the law controled
future elections and will harm future candidates).
55. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
56. Id. at 111 n.11.
57. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) (affirming that class actions are not moot if a
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of unnamed persons described in the certification takes on its own legal
status, separate from that of the named plaintiff.58 On the basis of this
independent interest in the outcome, a live controversy continues to
exist for Article III purposes.59
II. ISSUES INHERENT TO MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
Within the broader mootness umbrella, there are two formulations
of the doctrine: constitutional mootness and prudential mootness.
Applying either constitutional or prudential reasoning in mootness
yields inconsistent jurisdictional outcomes because each is animated by
different concerns with and conceptions of judicial power. Thus, Section
A addresses how both prudential and constitutional mootness
conceptualize the role of the courts within our federalist system.
Section B highlights the tensions resulting from the lack of a unitary
mootness approach by juxtaposing two university affirmative action
cases.
A. The Source of Doctrinal Tension: The Prudential and
Constitutional Mootness Distinction
1. Constitutional Mootness
The constitutional approach treats mootness as a mandatory bar to
the exercise of jurisdiction.60 Article III’s language ultimately sets out
defined parameters to judicial power that cannot be abrogated.61
Accordingly, the Court cannot hear a case where there is no case or
controversy defined in strict constitutional terms.62
Several justices have adopted this narrow interpretation of the case
or controversy requirement, emphasizing that historical limits to the
Court’s power add color to the “case” and “controversy” requirement
controversy exists between a named defendant and a member of the class though the named
plaintiff’s claim is moot).
58. Id. at 399.
59. Id.
60. See Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) (“Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot
cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of
judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.”).
61. Hall, supra note 1, at 574 (“The corollary to this constitutional understanding of
mootness is that courts lack power to create exceptions to the mootness bar. Because the doctrine
is a jurisdictional bar mandated by the Constitution, the constitutional text must determine the
bounds of the doctrine.”).
62. Id. See also Honig, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I cannot believe that
it is only our prudence, and nothing inherent in the [Constitution] that restrains us from
pronouncing judgment . . . .”).
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imposed by Article III.63 In Honig v. Doe, Justice Scalia emphasized in
dissent that the “case or controversy” language is empty absent
reference to traditional limitations on common law courts.64 For him,
the terms “[j]udicial [p]ower,” “[c]ases,” and “[c]ontroversies,” import
these historical limits on jurisdiction.65 Justice Frankfurter took a
similar position: He argued that the “cases” and “controversies”
language extends judicial power only to those matters traditionally
decided by the courts of Westminster.66 He noted that the Framers
drafted Article III with reference to “the familiar operations of the
English judicial system and its manifestations . . . .”67 Consequently,
these customs inform the meaning of Article III.68
The Court first tethered mootness to the constitutional case or
controversy requirement in Liner v. Jafco, Inc.69 In a footnote, the Court
declared that its “lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from
. . . Article III . . . under which the exercise of judicial power depends
upon the existence of a case or controversy.”70 Here, the Court went
farther than previous commentary on the source of mootness doctrine
and anchored its analysis directly to constitutional language.71 The
Court’s proposition that a moot case is not a case or controversy in the
constitutional sense has been accepted in subsequent opinions.72
Proponents of the constitutional approach understand mootness
exceptions as instances where, despite circumstantial changes, there
remains a live controversy.73 The exceptions are not mootness doctrine
63. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 340 (citing Justice Fields and the Framers to support the
contention that the “case or controversy” requirement is defined by traditional limits on court
power).
64. Id.
65. See id. (“Article III . . . adopts those limitations through terms (“The judicial Power;”
“Cases;” “Controversies”) that have virtually no meaning except by reference to that tradition.”).
66. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 375 U.S. 301 (1964). Prior to Liner, mootness rested on common law principles barring
courts’ from deciding cases where no dispute existed. Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 373, 374 (1974) (citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). The doctrine drew on
efficiency and economy rationales, contending that the state should not “be burdened with the
expense of trying such unsubstantial controversies.” Id. (citing Searcy v. Fayette Home Tel., 143
Ky. 811, 812 (1911)).
70. Liner, 375 U.S. at 306 n.3.
71. Tsen Lee, supra note 24, at 612.
72. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam); North Carolina v.
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
73. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Art. III
“restrains us from pronouncing judgment in a case that the parties have settled, or a case involving
a nonsurviving claim where the plaintiff has died, or a case where the law has been changed so
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overrides; instead, they capture factual circumstances in which the
Court has the constitutional power to exercise jurisdiction. According
to Justice Scalia, “where the conduct has ceased . . . but there is a
demonstrated probability that it will recur, a real-life controversy
between parties with a personal stake in the outcome continues to
exist” for Article III purposes.74 Thus, in those circumstances, judgment
on the merits is no more problematic than an ordinary grant of relief.75
2. Prudential Mootness
The prudential approach recognizes that mootness is not
constitutionally mandated and instead turns on practical concerns.76
Prudential mootness does not ask whether the Court has the
constitutional power to grant relief; rather, it emphasizes the Court’s
discretion to exercise that power.77 Pursuant to this formulation, the
Court may “stay[] its hand” when a non-moot controversy is best
resolved by other branches of government.78 The Court treats such
cases as moot for prudential reasons, not for failure to meet Article III
requirements.79 In its application of this approach, the Court is
motivated by the desire to conserve resources,80 preserve power,81 and
that the basis of the dispute no longer exists, or a case where conduct sought to be enjoined has
ceased and will not recur”). Note, Justice Scalia recognizes that the “yet evading review” prong
of the capable of repetition yet evading review exception is prudential though the probability of
reoccurrence is essential to jurisdiction. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. (“Where the conduct has ceased for the time being but there is a demonstrated
probability that it will recur, a real-life controversy between parties with a personal stake in the
outcome continues to exist, and Art. III is no more violated than it is violated by entertaining a
declaratory judgment action.”).
76. See Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“In some circumstances, a controversy, not actually moot, is so attenuated that considerations of
prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its hand,
and to withhold relief it has the power to grant.”).
77. See Hall, supra note 1, at 564 (noting that prudential mootness treats dismissal as matters
within the Court’s discretion).
78. Chamber of Commerce, 627 F.2d at 291.
79. United States v. (Under Seal), 757 F.2d 600, 603 (4th Cir. 1985).
80. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191–92
(2000) (holding that “[i]n contrast [to standing], by the time mootness is an issue, the case has
been brought and litigated, often (as here) for years. To abandon the case at an advanced stage
may prove more wasteful than frugal”); Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (citing the inefficiency of bringing separate claims in its mootness
determination).
81. See, e.g., U.S. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (holding a suit lacking sufficient
adversity “does not assume the ‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights’ to be
adjudicated—a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process”); Walling v. Reuter
Co., 321 U.S. 671, 675–78 (1944) (ruling that defendant’s cessation of business and dissolution
does not deprive the Court of the power to review appeals from the lower court judgment); Hall,
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ensure that litigation is pursued by parties who are interested in the
outcome and are properly motivated.82
A proponent of prudential mootness, Chief Justice Rehnquist
believed that mootness cannot be a constitutional doctrine because
there are exceptions to it83 and because it is logically impossible to
make exceptions to the Constitution.84 The Chief Justice further
stressed that the connection between mootness and the Article III case
or controversy requirement is “attenuated,” and “may be overridden
where there are strong reasons” to do so.85 Rehnquist framed mootness
as an “unwillingness to decide moot cases,” rather than an absolute
impediment to jurisdiction.86 Consistent with this permissive view, he
proposed a new mootness exception grounded in efficiency:87 The
Court should hear moot cases where significant resources have already
been expended and the Court could have reached the merits but for a
change of circumstance.88
B. Current Mootness Doctrine Treats Similar Cases Dissimilarly
Because the Court nevertheless hears cases that are moot, the
Court has approached mootness in a way that is neither consistently
constitutional or nor consistently prudential.89 Rather, the doctrine has
evolved into a chimera of both; mootness is highly malleable. This
section explicates the practical reasons that drive the hodge-podge
mootness framework and applies these principles to two similarly
situated plaintiffs.

supra note 1, at 568 n.21 (citing Coxe v. Phillips, 95 Eng. Rep. R. 152, 152 (1736)) (holding that
attempt to conduct fictitious action was contempt of court).
82. Waite v. Dowley, 94 U.S. 527, 534 (1876) (“This court does not sit here to try moot cases
to solve a question which may never be raised by any party entitled to raise it.”). See also Hall,
supra note 1, at 570 (noting that courts applying prudential mootness historically considered
“judicially economy, avoidance of party gamesmanship, and the desirability of resolving issues
that were both substantively important and likely to recur” and consistently applied this
framework until Liner).
83. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“If it were indeed
Art. III which . . . underlies the mootness doctrine, the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
exception relied upon by the Court in this case would be incomprehensible.”).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 331.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 332.
88. Id.
89. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 756 n.8 (1976) (highlighting a set of
mootness rules rooted in policy, rather the constitution). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97
(1968) (noting the “subtle pressures which cause policy considerations to blend into the
constitutional limitations of Article III”).
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Some constitutional law scholars like Erwin Chemerinsky,90
Alexander Bickel,91 and David O’Brien92 see justiciability doctrines
like mootness as malleable tools to skirt (or confront) important social
and political questions. Further, to encourage state experimentation
with social policy, the Court exploits justiciability to avoid commenting
on new laws.93 By the same token, the Court may also avoid confronting
the merits of politically divisive cases to safeguard and cultivate its
legitimacy.94 Within the separation of powers framework, the Court
lacks the powers to implement its decisions,95 so to ensure compliance
with a particular decision, the Court must be able to compel
compliance generally through its image and prestige.96
Moreover, the constitutional and prudential mootness distinction
can be outcome determinative if the case is technically moot but there
are compelling prudential reasons to hear the case anyway.97 Two cases,
Defunis v. Odegaard and Fisher v. University of Texas (II), show how
the doctrine’s lack of a unitary theoretical approach produces disparate
outcomes. DeFunis v. Odegaard98 typifies the ways in which
uncertainties in the doctrine can be manipulated to produce desired
outcomes. DeFunis marked the first time that the Court took a case
challenging a university’s affirmative action admissions policy. In
DeFunis, a white man denied law school admission under an
affirmative action policy alleged discriminated in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.99 DeFunis consequently sought an injunction
commanding the school to admit him.100 But by the time of the Court’s
review, DeFunis had been accepted to that law school and was in his

90. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 682
(1990) (noting that outcomes can turn on the Court’s characterization of the justiciability issue).
91. EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA 157 (1st ed. 2011).
92. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
183 (Aaron Javsicas eds., 9th ed. 2011).
93. TSEN LEE, supra note 91, at 157.
94. See Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1108,
1139 (1995) (noting the Court’s efforts to maintain its institutional prestige).
95. See O’BRIEN, supra note 92, at 27 (emphasizing that early abortion cases forced the
Court to confront its limited power as “a political institution whose legitimacy is nonetheless
perceived to depend largely on symbolism and reality of judicial independence”); see also id. at
337 (highlighting the Court’s failed attempts to implement immediate and widespread school
desegregation); id. at 314 (“Denied the power of the sword or the purse, the Court must cultivate
its institutional prestige.”).
96. Hellman, supra note 94, at 1139.
97. Hall, supra note 1, at 589.
98. 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
99. Id. at 314.
100. Id.
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third year.101
The Court held that because DeFunis would “receive his diploma
regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the merits,”102 he
had been accorded precisely the remedy he sought—admission to that
law school.103 And because DeFunis had secured the relief he had
sought, “the controversy between the parties clearly ceased to be
‘definite and concrete’ and no longer ‘touch[ed] the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests.’”104 Thus, the Court held that the
case was moot.105
Cognizant of the mootness issue when the Court granted certiorari,
the liberal justices had intended to reach the merits and validate
affirmative action in universities.106 However, Justice Powell held the
swing vote and took a more centrist position than the other liberals,
joining the conservative majority bloc.107 He may have been deferring
to the political process to normalize affirmative action, searching for a
better case to advance his position, or buying time to refine his
position.108 Nevertheless, assured that DeFunis would be able to
graduate,109 the Court punted on a politically charged question and
“announced a new principle: ‘Difficult cases are moot.’”110
In this case, the Court framed the mootness inquiry in
constitutional terms, first affirming the doctrine’s constitutional
moorings.111 The Court held that “the inability of the federal judiciary
‘to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the
Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon
the existence of a case or controversy.’”112 The Court elaborated that
“[t]he starting point for [mootness] analysis is the familiar proposition
that ‘federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot
101. Id. at 315.
102. Id. at 317.
103. Id.
104. Id. Importantly, DeFunis did not seek class certification so the class action exception
could not save his case from dismissal on mootness grounds. Id. at 314.
105. Id. at 320–21.
106. TSEN LEE, supra note 91, at 158.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (“That [DeFunis would graduate from law school] was all the conservatives and
Powell wanted to hear.”).
110. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 123 (quoting DAVID CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 77 n.3 (4th ed. 1990)).
111. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam) (citing Liner v. Jafco, Inc.,
375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964), the seminal case wedding mootness to the Constitution).
112. Id. (citing Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964)) (emphasis added).
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affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.’”113 Limiting
jurisdiction to cases where there is concrete adversity and shying away
from abstract questions of politics and policy,114 the Court tethered
mootness rules to the “[c]onstitutional limits”115 articulated in standing
decisions. On its face, this framing rejects prudential mootness: If
mootness is “derive[d]” from constitutional requirements and
“depends on the existence of a case or controversy,” jurisdiction cannot
turn on prudential concerns like sunken litigation costs or threats to
court power. Prudential concerns are extra-constitutional by definition.
However, the Court deviated from this constitutional articulation
of mootness in Fisher v. University of Texas II,116 relaxing the doctrine
“as only a prudential model of mootness would permit.”117 In that case,
the Court reached the merits of a university affirmative action case and
did not raise the mootness question.118 Like DeFunis, plaintiff Abigail
Fisher sought injunctive and declaratory relief compelling the
university to reconsider her application on a race-blind basis.119 She too
did not seek class certification and had graduated from another
university before the Court could hear the case.120 Already a graduate,
the Court’s ruling would have had no real effect on Fisher, just as a
ruling would have had no real effect on DeFunis. Because DeFunis and
Fisher were similarly situated, DeFunis should have controlled and
Fisher should not have presented a live controversy. Nevertheless, the
Court reached the merits and upheld the university’s policy, ruling that
the affirmative action policy was narrowly tailored to a compelling
state interest in promoting diversity in higher education.121
On highly similar facts, DeFunis and Fisher II reached vastly
different outcomes. The Court erected a high mootness bar in DeFunis
yet bulldozed that mootness barrier in Fisher II. Absent a consistent
and clear approach to mootness, the Court may manipulate mootness
113. Id.
114. The Court declined to comment on the state of affirmative action. See id. at 318
(generally noting the “public interest in having the legality of the practices settled” in cases of
voluntary cessation without specific mention of affirmative action).
115. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984).
116. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
117. Hall, supra note 1, at 589.
118. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (upholding the school’s policy because it satisfied strict
scrutiny).
119. Brief for Respondent at 13, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No.
14-981), 2015 WL 6467640.
120. Id. at 18 (arguing that plaintiff’s claim is moot because she had graduated from LSU and
did not seek class certification).
121. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214.
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doctrine to reach or avoid questions of constitutional and normative
import. This is where NYSRPA, had it constitutionalized mootness,
could have injected consistency and predictability into the doctrine and
where it failed.
III. STANDING
To reiterate, standing and mootness are often inextricably linked in
a court’s jurisdiction determination. Like mootness, standing has been
parsed for prudential and constitutional elements. Over time, the Court
has mislabeled elements of standing, characterizing as “prudential”
elements better understood as constitutional. The Court recently cast
doubt on prudential standing in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc.122 In Lexmark, the Court reaffirmed
standing’s constitutional roots, emphasizing that standing rules derive
from courts’ limited power to decide “cases” and “controversies” and
separation of powers principles.123 From these principles, the Court
noted that it has distilled requirements that comprise a “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing.”124 These standing requirements
cannot be abrogated and, thus, the Court rejected the notion that it
could reach the merits on prudential grounds.125 The Court was clear
that separation of powers limits federal court jurisdiction to only those
cases pleading a particular injury to a personal right caused by the
defendant,126 a principle that runs through standing cases127 and is
helpful in understanding the concerns driving the Court’s recent
mootness decisions.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL-PRUDENTIAL DISTINCTION & NYSRPA
The constitutional/prudential mootness distinction can be outcome
determinative if the case is moot but there are compelling reasons to
reach the merits.128 In the subset of cases where the distinction is
determinative, courts can relax the doctrine to hear the case. “[W]hen

122. 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014) (“Although we admittedly have placed [the “zone of interests”]
test under the “prudential” rubric in the past, it does not belong there . . . .”).
123. Id. at 125.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 128 (“We do not ask whether in our judgment Congress should have authorized
Static Control’s suit, but whether Congress in fact did so.”).
126. Id. at 125.
127. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (emphasizing that separation of
powers principles delineate the role of the judiciary and define justiciability doctrine).
128. Hall, supra note 1, at 589.
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prudential factors strongly favor hearing a moot claim, courts find a
way to hear the claim, even at the expense of distorting the doctrine”129
—and predictability. NYSRPA falls within this subset of cases given the
heated political discourse surrounding the underlying Second
Amendment claim. Accordingly, this part (1) argues that the Court’s
mootness approach would have determined NYSRPA’s outcome, (2)
analyzes the per curiam opinion for evidence of either constitutional or
prudential mootness, revealing both a constitutional framing and
analysis of mootness rules, and (3) parses the dissent and uncovers only
a facially constitutionalized argument.
A. Why the Constitutional-Prudential Mootness Distinction Matters
As a close and politically charged case, NYSRPA falls within the
subset of cases where the distinction is outcome determinative. In
NYSRPA, New York City residents challenged the City’s prohibition
on transport to non-City secondary homes and shooting ranges.130
Three months after the Court granted certiorari, the City amended its
ordinance to allow licensed firearms transport to non-City secondary
homes and shooting ranges.131 New York State then enacted a law
barring cities from restricting licensed transport outside the city.132 In
response to these developments, the City filed a Suggestion of
Mootness with the Court.133 Both parties presented compelling
arguments as to whether the voluntary cessation exception applied.134
Petitioners contended that the City continued to micromanage their
Second Amendment rights; thus, they argued that reassurances the City
would not revert to the old regulations were suspect.135 Rather than
admit error,136 the City cited the New York state law preempting

129. Id.
130. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 86 F. Supp. 3d 249, 257
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d sub nom. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883
F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded sub nom. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
131. 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3) (2019).
132. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(6) (2019).
133. Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 14.
134. See Resp. to Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 22–23, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2019) (No. 18-280), 2019 WL 35458533451573. See
also Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 14, at 19.
135. See Resp. to Respondent’s Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 143, at 26 (“The City’s
postcertiorari efforts to insulate its actions from this Court’s review thus provide no comfort
whatsoever that it would not revert to its past ways once the threat of this Court’s review has
passed . . . .”).
136. Id. at 25.
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inconsistent city laws.137 Because the City did not admit error,
Petitioners argued that the change in City and State law was a product
“of an acknowledged City-orchestrated effort to frustrate this Court’s
review”138 and the Court could not be sure that the City would not
reinstate its policy. Petitioners stressed that, in light of the dubious
circumstances of the City’s repeal and State’s amendment, the City
could not “begin to meet its heavy burden of proving that it is
‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.’”139 Therefore, Petitioners conclude
that the voluntarily cessation exception applied.140 Respondents argued
that the voluntary cessation exception did not apply because the newly
adopted State law provided for the transport of firearms outside the
city and barred the City from passing rules inconsistent with state
law.141 So even if the City wanted to reinstate the old regulations, New
York State law would prevent it from doing so.142
Further, pressing prudential considerations weighed in favor of a
judgment on the merits. Justices Alito,143 Gorsuch,144 Thomas,145 and
Kavanaugh146 stressed the need to address the Second Amendment
claim, highlighting that the Court has yet to address lower courts’
uneven applications of District of Columbia v. Heller.147 Justices Alito,
Gorsuch, and Thomas further emphasized the need to protect the
Court’s power and docket, arguing that the City’s attempt to supplant
the old regulations while the case was pending review “permits [the
Court’s] docket to be manipulated in a way that should not be
countenanced.”148

137. Id. at 28.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 30 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
719 (2007)).
140. See id. at 33 (arguing that the City has failed to show mootness where there is voluntary
cessation).
141. Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 14, at 17. Voluntary cessation doctrine requires a
showing that the legislature will return to the old policy. See id. (clarifying that a party cannot
evade judicial review by temporarily altering its behavior).
142. Id. at 19.
143. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1527 (2020)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
147. See 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (holding that the “Second Amendment right is exercised
individually and belongs to all Americans”).
148. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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B. NYSRPA and Theories of Mootness
The NYSRPA majority decision is an exercise of constitutional
mootness—the Court’s language and reasoning evince as much. Where
the language in NYSRPA is lacking, the Court’s standing jurisprudence
sheds light on the current state of mootness as articulated in NYSRPA.
Certain parallels between the justiciability doctrines’ animating
concerns indicate that mootness doctrine, like standing, is
constitutional at its core. Standing in particular suffers from the same
infirmity as mootness: It too muddies the waters and mischaracterizes
constitutional concerns as prudential.149 Despite the muddled labels,
standing jurisprudence focuses on whether plaintiffs “present[] issues
with sufficient concrete adverseness to those whose invocation of the
power of judicial review is most consistent with the constitutional
premises regarding the proper role of the federal judiciary.”150 This
section shows that NYSRPA was animated by the same fundamental
concerns.
Recall, that in NYSRPA: (1) Petitioners sought injunctive and
declaratory relief from the City’s old ordinance,151 (2) because the City
rule was replaced, Petitioners had obtained to the precise relief they
sought,152 (3) granted the precise relief sought, there was no longer an
injury caused by an adverse party for which the Court could provide a
remedy.153
The first question is whether NYSRPA evinces either a
constitutional or prudential approach to mootness. In its articulation of
the mootness framework, the Court cited constitutionalized mootness
rules,154 suggesting that the Court meant to import a constitutional view
of mootness, though this alone is not dispositive.155 Importantly, the
Court did not explicitly ground its articulation of mootness rules in
149. See Floyd C. Douglas, Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 862, 869–70 (1985).
150. Id. at 882.
151. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1526 (majority).
152. Id.
153. See id. (ruling that Petitioners have the “precise” relief they sought in their complaint).
154. Id. at 1527.
155. The Court cites Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp. and Differender v. Cent. Baptist Church.
Lewis grounded the Court’s jurisdiction in Article III, limiting jurisdiction to disputes in which “a
litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 494 U.S. 472, 475–76 (1990). Differender
likewise couched mootness as a mandatory bar to jurisdiction, requiring the existence of a
controversy to exercise jurisdiction. See 404 U.S. 412, 414 (1972) (ruling that the case “lost its
character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory
opinions”) (emphasis added).
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Article III or reference the case or controversy requirement, which are
typically hallmarks of a constitutional mootness approach.156 But nor
did the majority reference prudential concerns such as courts’ equitable
powers, efficiency, and judicial economy.157 So because the opinion itself
provided few explicit clues as to the proper approach to mootness, the
Court’s formulation of standing doctrine may provide insight.
The parallels between mootness and standing reveal a
constitutional theory of mootness. Although NYSRPA did not
explicitly nod to the injury-in-fact requirement, the reasoning turned
on a lack of injury caused by an adverse party. In ruling that the
amended local and state laws, which allowed for transport to non-City
second homes and shooting ranges, had provided Petitioners the
precise relief they sought,158 the Court indirectly ruled that Petitioners
no longer suffered from the alleged injury. Thus, like constitutional
standing decisions, NYSRPA hinged on the existence of a legally
defined injury to a personal right. Again, like constitutional standing,
NYSRPA denied court access to plaintiffs who did not plead sufficient
concrete adverseness and echoed the Court’s understanding of the
judiciary’s limited constitutional role.
Further, the Court’s treatment of the new ordinance was consistent
with broader constitutional standing precedent. In NYSRPA, the
record was not sufficiently developed to ascertain the injury to
Petitioners’ Second Amendment rights.159 The “continuous and
uninterrupted” provision was not briefed and, as the record stood
before the Court, the provision’s meaning and the City’s enforcement
procedures remained unknown. Without this crucial information, it was
not clear how and to what extent the City’s new rule had injured or
would injure petitioners. Consequently, as the record stood, petitioners
did not allege injuries directly caused by the adverse party. Here too,
NYSRPA represented another instance in which the Court refused to
grant petitioners relief for want of concrete adverseness.
Much like the Court’s constitutional standing cases, quintessentially
prudential concerns did not animate NYSRPA. There was no reference

156. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1525 (failing to cite Art. III in
articulation of mootness rules).
157. See id. (omitting reference to court power or litigation costs).
158. Id.
159. See id. (noting that, where plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to bring a claim under
the new law, the Court vacates so that parties can amend pleadings and develop the record) (citing
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 482–83 (1990)).
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to efficiency or sunk litigation costs. Justice Rehnquist found the
economy rationale particularly persuasive where significant resources
were spent to appeal to the highest court and the obstacle to review
was a change in factual circumstances.160 NYSRPA fit squarely within
Rehnquist’s criteria because it reached the highest court—SCOTUS—
and a change in the law precluded review. But in spite of prudential
considerations, the Court did not find injuries or damages under either
the old or new ordinance and held the case to be moot. In this respect,
the opinion rejected prudential reasoning.
In the face of strong prudential and practical policy concerns that
weighed in favor of a judgment on the merits, the Court stuck to its
constitutional guns. And although the Second Amendment issue was
likely compounded by the impending presidential election, potential
changes to the Court’s composition,161 and media coverage of police
brutality and mass shootings, the Court addressed none of these
considerations.162 Furthermore, the case presented an opportunity to
clarify Heller, as the dissent would have preferred.163 The original
ordinance was the first law of its kind,164 and no other state has enacted
such stringent laws regulating the transport of firearms.165 Yet, the
opinion did not highlight the immediacy of the Second Amendment
question.

160. Nichol, supra note 7, at 705.
161. Justice Amy Coney Barret was confirmed in October 2020. Nicholas Fandos, Senate
Confirms Barrett, Delivering for Trump and Reshaping the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/us/politics/senate-confirms-barrett.html.
162. Jill Cowan, Amy Harmon, & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Santa Clara Shooting is
TIMES
(Nov.
14,
2019),
Another
Nightmare
Made
Real,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/14/us/school-shooting-santa-clarita.html. See also Adam
Liptak, N.Y. TIMES, After School Shooting, Bill Focuses on Banks and Guns, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct.
6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/business/dealbook/banks-gun-crime.html (“The
[C]ourt is going to have to decide this question of mootness against the backdrop of several recent
highly-publicized episodes of gun violence and heated debate between the two parties about
solutions to gun violence.”).
163. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (Alito, J., dissenting).
164. Robert Barnes, New York Eased Gun Law Hopeful Supreme Court Would Drop Second
Amendment Case — But That Hasn’t Happened Yet, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/new-york-eased-gun-law-hopeful-supremecourt-would-drop-second-amendment-case—but-that-hasnt-happened-yet/2019/08/10/9031682ebab6-11e9-a091-6a96e67d9cce_story.html (“The New York restrictions were unique — no other
jurisdiction has such strict rules on transporting a weapon.”).
165. Id.
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C. The Dissent and Mootness166
Although Justice Alito purported to engage with constitutional
mootness,167 the dissent is actually animated by prudential concerns.
Justice Alito emphasized the Court’s long silence on Heller168 and the
need to address lower courts’ uneven applications of that precedent.169
The dissent also regarded silence on the Second Amendment issue as
an affront to the Court’s power and legitimacy. Alito further stressed
the need to protect the Court’s power and docket, arguing that by
amending the old regulations while the case was pending review, the
City had effectively manipulated the Court’s docket.170
The injury analysis in particular was by belied by a desire to reach
the merits. Justice Alito grounded his analysis of the injury and request
for relief in terms of harms caused by the new ordinance’s “continuous
and uninterrupted” transport requirement.171 Focusing on how the
“continuous and uninterrupted transport requirement” infringes on the
Second Amendment right, Justice Alito reached the merits based on an
injury Petitioners did not allege. Petitioners, as the majority noted, did
not have the opportunity to challenge the “continuous and
uninterrupted” transport requirement.172 Rather, Petitioners sought the
right to transport their firearms to non-City second homes and shooting
ranges because the old ordinance categorically barred them from doing

166. This paper will focus on the dissent because the concurrence reaches the same
constitutional understanding of the doctrine. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at
1527 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
167. Justice Alito acknowledged that mootness acts as a constitutional bar to jurisdiction:
“Under the Constitution, our authority is limited to deciding actual cases or controversies, and if
this were no longer a live controversy—that is, if it were now moot—we would be compelled to
dismiss.” Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). He explicitly noted that mootness is rooted in the case or
controversy requirement. Id. Couching the existence of a live controversy as “compelling” the
mootness outcome, Justice Alito also rejected the view that mootness is a matter of discretion as
prudential mootness suggests. Id.
168. See 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (holding that the “Second Amendment right is exercised
individually and belongs to all Americans”).
169. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id.
(Alito, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 1531 (characterizing the relief sought as unrestricted access to second homes
and shooting ranges outside the city); see also id. at 1534–35 (finding that the less restrictive City
rule did not remedy the injury because it did not provide unrestricted access).
172. See id. at 1526 (majority) (ruling that “where the mootness is attributable to a change in
the legal framework governing the case, and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim
under the new framework that was understandably not asserted previously, our practice is to
vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary,
amend their pleadings or develop the record more fully”) (citing Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist
Church of Miami, Inc., 404 U.S. 412, 415 (1972)).
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so. 173 The new City and State amendments specifically provided for
such a right.174 Ultimately, because he did not apply a recognized
exception to mootness doctrine, reaching the merits based on this
reframing of the injury deviates from traditional constitutionalized
mootness requirements.
V. DISCUSSION
To reach the merits of important cases, the Court has advanced
inconsistent reasoning. The need to adhere to precedent, combined
with the fact that certiorari was granted because several justices wanted
to reach the merits, has made the Court say “very silly and indefensible
things.”175 Indeed, the Court’s application of the mootness doctrine has
undermined both the consistency and predictability of outcomes and
the legitimacy of the Court itself.176 To point to a few notable examples,
Roe and DeFunis represent “dramatic variations in jurisdictional
analysis.”177 When suitable, “[t]the Supreme Court lowers the mootness
barrier to reach an abortion issue [in Roe] or bolsters it to put
affirmative action on hold” in Defunis.178 Because the Court
manipulates mootness to reach (or, in certain cases, avoid) the merits,
doctrine does not actually drive the analysis in cases where the
approach—constitutional or prudential—is outcome determinative.179
The NYSRPA majority and dissent suffer from the same
inconsistency as DeFunis and Fisher II. The majority in Fisher II neither
cited prudential considerations nor applied a recognized mootness
exception to reach the merits. Declining to apply a mootness exception,
the Fisher II Court relied on ordinary justiciability principles to decide
the merits. Applying fundamental mootness doctrine, no principled
reasons—other than underlying prudential considerations—accounted
for jurisdictional differences in DeFunis and Fisher II. Similarly, the
NYSRPA majority and dissent did not expressly reference prudential
concerns or apply the mootness exceptions; rather both purported to
apply fundamental—and constitutional—principles and, yet, the
majority and dissent came down on the mootness question differently.
173. Id.
174. See id. (holding Petitioners had access to the precise relief sought).
175. Nichol, supra note 7, at 708.
176. See Hall, supra note 1, at 564 (“[M]ootness does not provide the analytical tools
necessary to explain or predict the results in a large number of mootness cases.”).
177. Nichol, supra note 7, at 713.
178. Id. at 714.
179. See Hall, supra note 1, at 564.
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In NYSRPA, the difference in jurisdictional outcomes intimated that,
while the dissent appeared to engage in constitutional reasoning,
Justice Alito’s was actually animated by prudential concerns.
Clarifying the correct approach to mootness would inject the
predictability the doctrine desperately needs. Whether the Court
affirms constitutional or prudential mootness, justices, judges, and
scholars alike can work through a set of defined concerns and
questions. With prudential mootness comes a distinct set of practical
concerns (cost, efficiency, economy) and exceptions (the traditional
exceptions to mootness). There is a limited universe of concerns that
matter to the Court. Scholars and judges may make educated and
reasoned assessments as to the weight the Court would assign to a
particular concern based on other decisions, dicta, and the current
sociopolitical climate. From these sources, we can ascertain what
matters to a particular Court at a particular time and predict the
outcome of a prudential mootness determination.
Though prudential mootness is not wholly unwieldy and provides
flexibility to the Court to address partisan and politically charged
constitutional claims, the constitutional approach to mootness brings
added certainty and clarity, eliminating discretion from mootness
determinations. Because constitutional mootness is constitutionally
grounded, it sets out strict and clear parameters to guide courts,
whereas prudential mootness looks to practical considerations and is a
squishier rule. Proponents of prudential mootness may respond that
flexibility allows the Court to track public opinion and remain
accountable. Yet, flexibility and discretion are the source of doctrinal
confusion. The Court ought not “lower[] the mootness barrier to reach
an abortion issue or bolster[] it to put affirmative action on hold”180 at
the expense of theoretical consistency. Individual justices may weigh
the costs spent on litigation, potential effects on courts’ power or reach,
and the importance of the underlying constitutional challenge very
differently, particularly in close cases. Given their malleability, these
factors may do little to discipline analyses. NYSRPA, had it affirmed
constitutional mootness, could have served this disciplinary function
and clarified the concerns and requirements underlying mootness
inquiries.

180. Nichol, supra note 7, at 714.
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CONCLUSION
Prudential and constitutional mootness are always the foundation
of mootness decisions. The Court has used both approaches and its
uneven treatment of mootness questions has resulted in an inconsistent
and unpredictable framework. Thus, to better understand the
animating concerns undergirding mootness decisions, we must look to
other justiciability doctrines. Standing provides some insight. Though
the Court has mislabeled elements of standing, decisions appear to be
grounded in constitutional rather than prudential concerns.181 A closer
look at mootness cases reveals a similar trend. Like standing, mootness
decisions evidence principled discussions of constitutional
requirements. NYSRPA is no outlier. Like recent mootness decisions,
NYSRPA is an exercise in constitutional reasoning, focused on whether
there is an injury for which the Court may offer relief within its
constitutionally mandated role. Looking to the future of mootness
doctrine, NYSRPA was a missed opportunity to clarify the proper
theoretical approach to mootness and ground the doctrine in a
predictable set of constitutionalized rules. Still, NYSRPA could serve
as a springboard to affirm constitutional mootness, given the majority’s
distinctly constitutional tone and result.

181. See Douglas, supra note 158, at 882 (“The driving force of most of the Burger Court’s
significant justiciability decisions is not a concern with assuring the presentation of issues in a
form suitable for judicial resolution, but a preoccupation with questions of separation of powers
and federalism.”).

